expert on Munchausen syndrome by proxy (MSBP) resulted in a number of women being convicted of killing their children and imprisoned. Eventually, the validity of the expert's theory was challenged successfully in court, a number of the convictions were quashed, and the women were freed." The same expert's theories had led to the removal of countless children from their families, again on the basis of evidence that the child's parent (usually the mother) suffered from MSPB and had abused the child as a result. Some of these children have been adopted into new families and the fallout from this issue is still being addressed. In the second example, Dr. Colin Paterson, a Scottish doctor, "identified" a condition known as temporary brittle bone disease (TBBD). According to his theory, TBBD provided an alternative explanation of certain injuries to children which displaced the suspicion that the injuries were non-accidental. He appeared as an expert witness for accused parents in criminal cases and in child protection litigation. While both his research and his findings were subsequently discredited, it is not entirely clear how many children may have been returned to their care-givers as a result of his evidence.
The coincidental occurrence of these two examples is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it reflects the eternal dilemma of child protection: what can be described as the "damned if you do, and damned if you don't" phenomenon. Overzealous intervention, designed to protect children from (alleged further) abuse, but without adequate foundation, risks unjustified removal of a child from his or her family, resulting in distress to family members, stigmatization of the parents, and the violation of the rights of both the child and the parents.' 2 On the other hand, failure to act timeously, when faced with allegations of abuse, risks exposing the child to further harm and possible death.1 3 In the MSBP example, the result of the expert's participation was over-inclusive prosecution and the, sometimes permanent, removal of children from their families. In the TBBD example, there was the danger of an under-inclusive response, resulting in children being returned to their abusers and being left unprotected. Second, both examples involved the courts in addressing the admissibility of, and value to be attached to, expert evidence. Third, in each case, the experts whose evidence was to be considered were respected members of the medical profession. Finally, each involved the ultimate discrediting of the expert's evidence because of the danger posed by the way he conducted his research and presented his evidence.
Further reflection and research established that problems with these syndromes or diseases are not unique to the legal systems in the United Kingdom, and cases concerning both issues can be found in many other jurisdictions. Nor were they the only examples of expert testimony being called into question in family-related cases and sometimes discredited.
14 This article will examine how the problematic examples of expert evidence about MSPB and TBBD played out in the United Kingdom and the harm that cases of this NCCPR, at http://www.nccpr.org (n.d.) (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) . Many states have responded by putting special procedures in place to investigate cases giving rise to concern. In Oregon, for example, such was the concern over failures in the child protection system that the The full Report, running to 264 pages, is available at: http://download.edinburgh.gov.uk/CalebNess. In 2002, also in Scotland, thirteen-month-old Carla-Nicole Bone died at the hands of her mother's boyfriend while her mother looked on, despite repeated pleas from family members to the local child protection agencies. Stuart Patterson and Craig Walker, Family's Anger at Baby Death Report, THE SCOTSMAN, Sept. 18, 2003, available at http://news.scotsman.com/scotand.cfm?id=1032682003&format=print. The man, Alexander McClure, is now serving a life sentence for murder. Id. Cases like these provided the impetus for the latest Scottish child protection review, which resulted in the report, It's Everyone's Job to Make Sure I'm Alright ScorrSH ExEcuTivE (2002) , available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library5/education/iaar-OO.asp.
14. See infra notes 37-50.
[Vol. 16:2 kind do, beyond the injustices suffered by the individuals involved. Drawing on the case law and literature from the United States,' 5 it will explore how U.S. jurisdictions have addressed the admissibility of expert evidence. In particular, it will examine the mechanisms that are in place to separate valid expert evidence from junk science: a dichotomy that, as we shall see, is rejected by sections of the scientific community. Finally, we will look at how the mechanisms might be improved: an issue which has implications well beyond the specific cases highlighted here. First, it may be helpful to consider the attraction of expert evidence for the legal system along with the attendant pitfalls.
THE ATIRACTIONS AND PITFALLS OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
The attraction of using expert witnesses in court proceedings is not difficult to fathom. To state the obvious, most lawyers and judges simply lack the expertise in a whole variety of non-legal disciplines to utilize the vast knowledge that these disciplines have to offer. Thus, courts need the assistance from experts in these disciplines in order to understand crucial information. Some commentators believe there is a fundamental problem in terms of what courts sometimes expect of expert scientific evidence. It is not simply that lawyers may not understand the information being presented but, rather, that there is something of a failure to comprehend the scientific process. This results in a tendency "to treat all science as a single discipline distinguished only by its classification as valid or junk."' 16 If we could get past this simplistic approach, so the argument goes, we would be in a position to make more subtle evaluations of particular evidence. As Edmond and Mercer put it:
The rejection of a simple dichotomy between "good" and "bad" science facilitates discussion in a number of areas otherwise precluded. For instance, questions relating to the efficacy of various sciences, their objectives, and the ethics of their practitioners can be examined in more specific local terms, freed from the need to anchor them to over-arching, unworkable, mythological images of science. 17 Somewhat paradoxically, it is this very ignorance of science that often results in non-scientists being mesmerized by it. Science is perceived as solid, 15 . Where appropriate, occasional references will be made to cases in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, but any full exploration of developments there will have to await a future article.
16 knowable, measurable: in short, science offers certainty.' 8 These factors combine to place the person who does understand science, the expert, in an incredibly powerful position. After all, if one is coming from a position of ignorance, the person who holds the key to that certain body of knowledge is something of a savior. The danger for the legal system is that this empowerment of the expert witness will result in undue deference to his or her opinion.
The deference to scientific expertise is magnified when it involves experts who are not only scientists but also doctors. Lawyers are constantly amazed at (and mildly irritated by) how well the medical profession has managed public relations when the legal profession has been so spectacularly unsuccessful in that arena. Despite the prevalence of medical malpractice actions, 9 members of the public, at least, remain largely deferential to, if not in awe of, the medical profession. Maybe it has something to do with the god-like power over life and death. Whatever the cause, there is no doubt that juries and some lawyers hold medical expert witnesses in particularly high regard. In addition, members of one profession tend to behave with the utmost courtesy to members of other professions. While anything that enhances good manners in the courtroom is to be welcomed, there is a danger that this simple courtesy may translate into undue deference. It is interesting to note that, prior to damning the evidence of Dr. Paterson, the expert witness on TBBD, Wall J., prefaced his remarks with the following statement:
[I]t is only fair that I should record at this point that [two other expert witnesses who disputed Dr. Paterson's findings] paid 18. This belief in the certainty of science is somewhat misplaced, not least because of the danger of "fashions", if not in the hard sciences, certainly in the social sciences. For instance, although the divorce of warring parents was once perceived as beneficial to children, summed up in the phrase "better one happy parent than two who are miserable", that view has been challenged by many studies and authors, [Vol. 16:2 tribute to the work which Dr. Paterson has done in the field of bone pathology. I should also record my own assessment of Dr. Paterson as a highly intelligent man whose manner is sympathetic and whose evidence was given persuasively with both enthusiasm and charm. 20 Certainly, lawyers and judges are not notorious for being particularly deferential. Nor are all lawyers and judges science-illiterate. That brings another danger into the picture. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to be a zealous advocate of his or her client's case, always within ethical bounds, of course. One result of this is that the lawyer will seek out expert testimony that will be of help to the client's case and a science-savvy lawyer will be somewhat selective in choosing the witnesses he or she calls. 2 ' It is a feature of the adversarial system that another lawyer will present the opposing case and will have the opportunity to do exactly the same thing. However, the adversarial system itself encourages one advocate to advance a particular scientific theory as valid and the other advocate to seek to dismiss it, again reflecting a lack of subtlety in the understanding of the scientific process.
What of the expert witness themselves? There is no doubt that many experts give evidence in a neutral and objective manner in order to assist the court in understanding the expert's particular field. The fact that many experts are paid for their services is no reason to assume that their objectivity is necessarily compromised. 22 Nonetheless, the fact that "career experts" do exist and that there is a lucrative industry in providing expert testimony might make one pause for thought. 23 That issue aside, there are other causes for caution. Given the powerful position of the expert witness, as the elucidator of knowledge to the ignorant, one might speculate that some experts enjoy being 24 in this position and the issue of the expert's ego enters the picture. A related danger is the extent to which the expert witness is personally invested in his or 22. In a recent Scottish case, the court was more concerned that the expert witnesses for the pursuer (plaintiff) gave their evidence free of charge, seeing this as a reflection of their commitment to a particular position and calling their impartiality into question. her own particular theory. By definition, an expert witness will have devoted considerable energy to working in a particular field. By and large, people prefer to have this devotion validated by it being proved to have been worthwhile, rather than feeling they have been wasting their time. Some experts will be speaking to their own original work. Bearing in mind that very few scientists achieve the fame associated with discovering penicillin or having a condition named after them, there is the danger that some experts will be so attached to their own theories that their ability to assess the theories objectively will be compromised. 25 In short, there are any number of reasons why, and ways in which, medical and other experts may provide less than objective and reliable evidence. That this danger is recognized by the medical profession itself is encouraging 26 and the profession will act against its own (eventually) where they are adjudged to fall below recognized professional standards. Of course, this will be little comfort to the child who has been injured further after being returned to an abusive parent or the parent whose child has been removed unjustifiably. Thus, the evidence of experts in the field, while often an essential part of child protection cases and associated prosecutions, is not without its dangers. How, then, did expert evidence play out in the selected examples of MSPB and TBBD?
MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME BY PROXY (MSBP)
The term "Munchausen syndrome" was coined in 1951 by Dr. Richard P. Asher to describe the condition where a patient repeatedly makes false claims of symptoms, or deliberately induces illness in himself or herself, in order to gain medical attention. 7 The element of proxy entered the picture in 1977, when (then 28 ) Dr. Roy Meadow applied the term to a care-giver, usually a mother, who did much the same thing, but to a child. 29 Thus, the term 25. As we shall see, there are elements of this in both of the examples discussed infra. 26. See Weintraub, supra note 19. "Inaccurate or false testimony is an embarrassment to our profession.. " Id. Chadwick and Krous provide the following criteria for irresponsible medical testimony, although they acknowledge that "other forms of irresponsible testimony will doubtless be described in the future": absence of proper qualifications; use of unique theories of causation; use of unique or very unusual interpretations of medical findings; alleging nonexistent medical findings; flagrant misquoting of medical journals or widely used texts; making false statements; and deliberate omission of important facts or knowledge pertinent to the Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy (MSBP) was born. 3° While it is most frequently used in the context of non-accidental injury to children, it can arise in other contexts.
3 1 When the mother makes false claims about a child's symptoms, sometimes made more credible by the production of "evidence" such as a urine sample she has tampered with, the danger is that the child will be subjected to unnecessary, and possibly painful, diagnostic procedures and treatment. 32 There is also the possibility that any condition the child does actually have will go undiagnosed. Where the mother goes as far as to induce illness, the threat to the child's health is obvious and the consequences can be fatal.
33
That some parents will harm their children, quite deliberately, is attested to by an abundance of civil and criminal case law, official enquiries, and academic and other literature on the subject. That some of them do so by means of alleging non-existent illness or fabricating symptoms is also reasonably clear. 34 Where concern about MSBP has arisen is in the way it was 30. While MSBP has been renamed "factitious disorder," the term MSBP will be used in this Article because it is the term used in most of the case law and literature and is, probably irreversibly, etched on the public consciousness.
31. The perpetrator need not be the mother of a child; other caregivers, including some with health care backgrounds, are sometimes implicated. One example is the case of Beverley Allitt, a nurse who was convicted of killing four children in her care and injuring nine others. 39. This was not the sole ground for allowing the appeal, since this Court heard for the first time about microbiology results, known to the prosecution but never disclosed to the defense, which led one expert to conclude that "overwhelming straphlococcal infection is the most likely cause of death" of one of the boys. Id. at 122. However, the Court did note that "it seems likely that if this matter had been fully argued before us we would, in all probability, have considered that the statistical evidence provided a quite distinct basis on which the appeal had to be allowed." Id. at J 180.
[Vol. 16:2 chances of backing long odds winners of the Grand National year after year it may have had a major effect on [the jury's] thinking notwithstanding the efforts of the trial judge to down play it". 4°I n 2002, Ms. Cannings was convicted of murdering her two sons by smothering. 4 ' Her appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed in 42 2003. Again, Sir Roy Meadow appeared as a prosecution witness and part of his evidence related to the statistical probability of two children in the same family dying of SIDS. Again, the appeal did not relate solely to his evidence, 43 although the Court raised some questions about it. 44 Concluding that the convictions were unsafe, the Court observed:
We recognise that the occurrence of three sudden and unexpected infant deaths in the same family is very rare, or very rare indeed, and therefore demands an investigation into their causes. Nevertheless the fact that such deaths have occurred does not identify, let alone prescribe, the deliberate infliction of harm as the cause of death. ... If on examination of all the evidence every possible known cause has been excluded, the cause remains unknown. 45 In the light of this case and those of Sally Clark and Trupti Patel, the court noted the unexplained nature of deaths due to SIDS and paid tribute to the continuing research. However, it issued the following stern warning:
We cannot avoid the thought that some of the honest views expressed with reasonable confidence in the present case (on both sides of the argument) will have to be revised in years to come, when the fruits of continuing medical research, both here and internationally, become available. What may be unexplained today may be perfectly well understood 40 . Id. at 178. The Grand National is the best-known horse race in the United Kingdom, attracting unparalleled sums in off-track betting. Thus, reference to it would strike a chord with any juror.
41. Ms. Cannings was also charged with the murder of the third of her four children, but that case did not proceed. R. v. Nor was Sir Roy Meadow's influence confined to the criminal arena. In the context of child protection, it is not known how many children have been removed from their parents' care on the basis of evidence of the kind leading to the criminal convictions outlined above. As we shall see, estimates vary and the truth is that the precise figure may never be known. 47 It appears that only three of the cases reviewed revealed cause for concern, prompting criticism from lawyers, doctors and parents convicted of killing their children. 5 6 Press reports initially suggested that as many as 5,000 children may have been removed from their families as a result of allegations of MSBP, although this figure has been questioned subsequently. 57 Initially, it was unclear whether these civil cases would be re-examined, with the Children's Minister, Margaret Hodge, and the Solicitor General, Harriet Harman, appearing to differ on the matter. 58 In any event, the government issued guidance to local authorities asking them to review their own cases. 59 One hundred and thirty of the one hundred and fifty local authorities responded to a survey conducted by the Association of Directors of Social Services.6° They reported that disputed medical evidence arose (or was anticipated to arise) in forty-seven of 5,175 cases. 6 ' The impact of the medical evidence was known in nine of these cases and, in a further thirty-eight, the case was not sufficiently advanced for the outcome to be clear. 62 That there have been calls for a public enquiry is hardly surprising but, at the time of writing, these calls have fallen on deaf government ears. Incredulity and outrage followed the announcement that Angela Cannings would receive no compensation from the state for the eighteen months she spent in prison wrongfully. 63 In Scotland, a parallel investigation of criminal cases was conducted by the Crown Office, the body responsible for bringing prosecutions. 64 (manslaughter), some going back as far as ten years, were re-examined and it was concluded that there had been no miscarriages ofjustice. 65 This was hardly a transparent process and, thus, did little to assuage public concern. The Scottish review of child protection cases involving the removal of children from their parents amid allegations of MSBP has been even less satisfactory. The Scottish Children's Reporter Administration (SCRA), responsible for investigating and pursuing child protection proceedings, re-examined some forty-three cases, dating from 1981 onwards, and found that three of them warranted a return to the courts. 66 Particularly disturbing was the admission by SCRA that five cases could not be reviewed in detail, "three because staff had only a vague recollection of a relevant case and therefore the child could not be identified, two because due to the passage of time the case files or papers are not available." 67 Little wonder, then, that a "SCRA insider" branded the review "a bit of a joke. 6 8 Indeed, the media seems to have had greater success in tracing cases of children removed from their families and sometimes adopted, amid allegations of MSBP, than has SCRA, albeit journalists have the luxury of relying on nothing more than the, sometimes partisan, accounts of the individuals involved. 6 9 It is hardly surprising that a number of parents are raising actions in court seeking to have their children returned to them 7° and calls for a public enquiry continue.
It is one function of the General Medical Council (GMC) in the United Kingdom to police the professional standards of its members. 7 [Vol. 16:2 case, from working in any area of child protection for the next three years.
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That decision was appealed to the High Court and, while it ruled that he should keep his medical license, it did call for the conditions applying to him to be tightened. 73 In June 2005, Dr. Alan Williams, the Home Office forensic pathologist who carried out the post-mortem examination on Sally Clark's sons and failed to disclose aspects of findings in his evidence at her trial, was found guilty of "serious professional misconduct" by the GMC's professional conduct committee and banned from Home Office pathology work for three years. 74 Finally, in July 2005, Sir Roy Meadow was also found guilty of "serious professional misconduct," largely for giving evidence beyond his field of expertise, and lost his license to practice medicine. 75 Ironically, it was expert evidence led at the hearing over allegations that he was guilty of "serious professional misconduct" that may have proved most damning in his case. Sir David Cox, retired Professor of Statistics at Imperial College London, gave evidence that Sir Roy Meadow made fundamental errors in calculating the probability of more than one infant in the same family dying from SIDS.76 As we shall see, the reaction of sections of the medical profession and the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health has been somewhat defensive, albeit the latter went on to respond more constructively thereafter. 77 Sir Roy's "striking off' was to prove short-lived since, seven months later, the High Court overturned the decision and reinstated his license. 78 MSBP has not escaped the notice of the European Court of Human Rights, although it has addressed the cases before it in terms of the procedures followed rather than the condition itself. 79 In It may be proper to criticize him for not disclosing his lack of expertise, but that does not justify a finding of serious professional misconduct". Id. at 54. It is understood that the GMC intends to appeal against this decision.
79. Precisely where the European Court is going on the issues of emergency removal of children from their parents, representation of the parents and the child, and adoption of children
2006]
a case also of interest for its trans-Atlantic dimension, a child, S, was removed from her parents at birth, largely due to concerns that the mother suffered from MSBP. 81 Finding violations of Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 8 (right to respect for family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950,82 the Grand Chamber concentrated on the lack of legal representation of the parents in the proceedings. In Venema v. Netherlands, 83 the Court found that the authorities in the Netherlands had violated the parents' Article 8 right to family life by denying the parents the opportunity to contest the allegations against them prior to the removal of their daughter and by acting on incomplete information, including allegations of MSBP."
The reach of Sir Roy Meadow's work goes far beyond the United Kingdom. In the United States, MSBP seems to have made its first appearance in the case law in 1981 when Priscilla Philips was convicted of murdering her daughter. 85 Subsequently, attorneys 86 and the press 87 drew attention to concerns over misdiagnosis of the condition. In Australia, the Queensland Court of Appeal set aside the verdict in the case of a woman who was convicted of torturing one of her children and wounding two others, and ordered a retrial, due to concern that the conviction resulted from undue reliance on the MSBP label. 88 In New Zealand, concern has been expressed over the removal of six against the wishes of their parents, is a fascinating subject which, sadly, is beyond the scope of this article. See also, K and T v. Finland (2001) Id. at 13. The mother, P, a citizen of the United States, had been convicted of child endangerment in California in respect of allegations that she administered laxatives inappropriately to her child, B, because she suffered from MSBP. B was removed from her care and placed with his father. P subsequently moved to England, married, and gave birth to S. Child protection authorities in the U.S. alerted the authorities in England to the earlier case and concerns that P suffered from MSPB. It was this information that triggered the removal of S.
Id. at 91R1 9-56. [Vol. 16:2 children from their mother amid allegations of MSBP. 89 It is no exaggeration to say that the recent experiences surrounding MSBP in the United Kingdom has rocked the world of child protection. Due largely to the work of one highly-influential man, who attracted quite a following in the medical community, a number of women served prison sentences for crimes they did not commit. Furthermore, some children were removed from their parents' care for months or years, and other children and parents have been lost to each other through adoption. That this can happen in developed legal systems is nothing short of scandalous. The courts were all too willing to listen to the dogmatic views of experts adhering to a particular theory and, while they may have learned something from this debacle, it remains to be seen whether the deference accorded to experts, and particularly medical experts, will be less absolute in the future. While some of the expert witnesses involved have been subject to sanction by their own professional body, the GMC, it was neither swift to act nor were the sanctions particularly severe. 9°B efore we examine the criteria the courts apply in admitting expert evidencecriteria designed to prevent just this sort of injustice from occurring -and the damage that cases of this kind cause, we will look at another example of the influence of an expert and how his theory played out in the courts.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

TEMPORARY BRITLE BONE DISEASE (TBBD)
If Sir Roy Meadow and the impact of his views on MSPB produced a media feeding frenzy, the reaction to Dr. Colin Paterson and his views on the existence of "temporary brittle bone disease" (TBBD), 9 1 amounted to something of a low-calorie snack. There never was a "Paterson's Law" sitting alongside Meadow's Law. TBBD did not attract a following amongst other members of the medical profession and, indeed, it was its rejection by other experts that may have reduced its impact. Unlike the investigations which followed the overturning of the convictions of Sarah Clark and Angela Cannings, there was initial resistance to the idea of reviewing the cases in 90. In the light of this, it is interesting to note that Dr. Paterson whose evidence on TBBD is equally questionable did lose his license: see footnotes 125-128 and accompanying text.
91. More recently, the term "transient brittle bone disease" has been used to describe the condition but, as with MSBP, TBBD will be used here since it is better known. While there is now a body of case law rejecting TBBD, which gives some of the strongest condemnation of an expert's testimony found in the law reports, it is not known how often his evidence held sway and led to the return of children to their families. 94 Writing in 1997, Dr. Paterson estimated that seventy-eight children had been returned to their parents after he gave evidence in care proceedings in England and Wales, 95 and his evidence had a similar effect in at least one Scottish case 9 6 and had an impact in at least two cases in the United States. 97 What, then, was the theory advanced by Dr. Paterson about this alleged condition, TBBD? Essentially, TBBD provides an alternative explanation to the cause of a pattern of injuries, specifically broken bones, in children. When a child comes to the attention of the authorities because of suspected abuse, part of the child's body will often be X-rayed, with a skeletal survey sometimes being carried out over the whole body. Sometimes the X-rays disclose previous injuries, including bone fractures, typically to the arms, wrists, legs, ankles, or ribs. If the child's caregiver(s) (usually the parent(s)) cannot provide an innocent explanation of how the injuries occurred that is consistent with the injuries themselves, then a strong suspicion arises that that the child has been abused. 98 In a small number of cases, a child will suffer from osteogenesis imperfecta (01), better known as brittle bone disease. 99 This is a permanent genetic condition, of varying severity, in which the sufferer has increased bone fragility, leaving him or her unusually susceptible to bone fractures. 10 Where a child has this condition, and it can usually be diagnosed using well-accepted tests, then the suspicion of non-accidental injury is displaced, since there is now GUARDIAN Where he departed from established medicine was by suggesting that there might be a condition, similar to 01, which created a susceptibility to bone fractures, but which was temporary. 0 3 Essentially, to put it in lay-person's terms, the child had suffered from brittle bone disease but had "recovered". Again, there was an innocent explanation for the child's past injuries. The problem was that, once the child healed, the condition could no longer be established by recognized tests. To fill that gap, Dr. Paterson provided his own explanation of what might cause TBBD and how it could be established using the evidence that did remain available. He noted similarities between TBBD and both copper deficiency and collagen defects. 1°4 He found that TBBD generally occurred within the first year of the child's life, appeared to be more common in twins and where birth had been premature. While there was usually no family history of brittle bones, there might be a history of bone laxity. The pattern of injuries often included fractures to the ribs and at the ends of long bones and the condition was sometimes accompanied by projectile vomiting and anemia. 1 TBBD attracted almost unanimous criticism from the medical community,107 and prosecutors were warned of this new defense.1 0 8 Much of the medical condemnation of the so-called disease was absolute. Kirschner stated, "the concept of 'temporary brittle bone disease' ... remains totally unsubstantiated", 109 and others expressed similar views."t 0 In addition, some commentators were concerned about the credentials of those involved in the research and the lack of opportunity to evaluate the findings."' Perhaps of fractures been sustained as a result of a series of deliberate injuries inflicted on a child with normal bones, it would be almost inconceivable that evidence of such injuries would not be obvious." However, Wall J. noted the evidence of two other experts "that fractures in young children frequently occur without evidence of bruising," and considerable support for this proposition can be found in the medical literature. Id. This led him to prefer the latters' evidence. Id.
107. There appears to be at least one domestic advocate of TBBD in the 111. Ablin & Sane, supra note 102, at 112 ("objective analysis of the data by an independent observer is not possible"); Ralph S. Lachman, Differential Diagnosis II: Osteogenesis Imperfecta, in DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING OF CHILD ABUSE 221 (Paul K. Kleinman, ed., 2d ed, 1998) ("because no radiologists were authors of this publication, and no details are given regarding the methods employed in the radiologic evaluation of these patients, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of these findings").
[Vol. 16:2 greatest concern was that "most of the radiologic features ascribed to transient brittle bone disease are those classically noted in cases of abuse." " 2 The English courts were the first to express concern over Dr. Paterson's evidence. Cazalet J. made the following observation in 1990: "[Dr. Paterson] accepted that he has been criticised in certain previous cases for developing particular theories as to their causation. In the present case, I think he may have developed a theory of causation rather than a diagnosis." 1 3 Similarly, in 1994, Wall J. noted:
Whilst the courts of course accept that there may be cases where there is a divergence between judicial and clinical findings, I regard as worrying in the extreme Dr. Paterson's failure to record in his research material of cases of proven brittle bone disease judicial findings to the contrary. In my judgment this is a factor which must cast the gravest doubt on his findings."14 He then went on to detail the following shortcomings in Dr. Paterson's evidence and contribution to the case: omission of reference to the child's brain damage; failure to disclose the controversial nature of his research and omission of factors that did not support his opinion, demonstrating a lack of objectivity; failure to record the fact that previous judicial findings cast doubt on the validity of his research data; reinforcing false hope in parents that they would be exonerated; and the resulting increase in costs in the case." 1 5 Lest his fellow judges had been too subtle in their criticism, Singer J. was even more forthright in 2001, when he said:
In my judgment, in relation to any future potential diagnosis by Dr. Paterson of TBBD, his methodology and his credentials to express opinion deserve to be and should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny before he is given leave to report in further cases. 
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Talmadge, a mother secured a retrial on child abuse charges on the basis that the trial court had improperly excluded Dr. Paterson's evidence. She and her partner (the child's father) were subsequently convicted and imprisoned.' 2 2
Despite opposition to his theory, Dr. Paterson made himself available to the courts as an expert witness on TBBD and, it will be remembered, according to his own estimate, in 1997, seventy-eight children had been returned to their parents after he gave evidence in care proceedings in the England and Wales.
123
It may be some tribute to the legal system that it was members of the judiciary who prompted the General Medical Council to intervene in Dr. Paterson [Vol. 16:2 continue appearing as an expert witness long after the courts had signaled disquiet over his evidence.
In March 2004, the professional conduct committee of the General Medical Council found Dr. Paterson guilty of serious professional misconduct, citing that his "criteria for the diagnosis of TBBD were unclear, and/or variable, with the result that the use of these criteria in legal proceedings could mislead others thereby posing an unacceptable risk to the safety of children."' ' 25 It is only fair to note that the chairwoman of the committee described Dr. Paterson as "an honest, dedicated professional.' 26 His license to practice medicine was withdrawn or, to put it in ordinary parlance, he was "struck off.' 27 Sections of the medical community regard the removal of his medical license as harsh.
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This, then, was what was being presented to courts from 1990 until 2001. As we have seen, the medical and scientific communities were skeptical of TBBD since its inception, ultimately condemning it. However, the theory continued to be advanced in the courts well after its dismissal due to the lack of scientific validity. That this could happen calls into question the whole issue of how so-called scientific evidence is admitted into court. Before the rules on admissibility of evidence are examined, it is worth exploring the harm caused by cases of this kind.
WHAT IMPACT DO CASES LIKE THESE HAVE?
It is stating the obvious to note that cases of the kind outlined above harm the individuals involved but, lest we forget, let us recap on the magnitude of that harm. Angela Cannings, Sally Clark and Donna Anthony are real women, not characters in a law school class hypothetical. Each spent years in prison Paterson Innis, GMC Ruling Unjust (June 16, 2004 ). Prior to Sir Roy Meadow being subject to the same sanction, albeit the sanction was short-lived, some commentators saw a sinister dimension in the fact that a person who gave evidence for the defense suffered a greater penalty than those who were witnesses for the prosecution. See von Kaehne, supra. before her conviction was overturned. Each had lost children and, far from her loss attracting the sympathy usually extended to a bereaved parent, was vilified and blamed for the deaths. Each had family members who, fortunately for them, often showed incredible courage, loyalty and determination in campaigning on her behalf. Nonetheless, these relatives too had suffered bereavement and their plight was exacerbated by the legal system. In addition, there are the families of living children, tom apart amid allegations of MSBP. Although estimates of the number of families affected vary widely, there are undoubtedly cases where expert evidence has resulted in children being removed from their parents and, sometimes, adopted into new families. 129 Whether, on review, the removal proves to be unjustified remains to be seen, but it seems likely that at least some cases of unwarranted removal will emerge. For the children who can be returned to their parents, the disruption has been enormous; for those who cannot, the toll is immeasurable. Similarly, the parents have experienced nightmares that few of us can truly comprehend. Conversely, in the TBBD cases, there is no way of knowing how many children may have been returned to abusive situations because of expert evidence. Nor is it known how many parents are failing to address fundamental parenting problems, believing they are doing nothing wrong.13 0 However, the damage done by cases of this kind goes well beyond those individuals directly involved. Such cases discredit the whole legal process. When people are wrongfully convicted and incarcerated, the credibility of the legal system is damaged. Although lawyers might argue that the later correction of these errors is something of a tribute to the legal system's ability to police itself, there is little doubt that considerable harm is done by the fact that the errors occurred in the first place. In the context of child protection, whether we are addressing over-zealous intervention (MSBP) or a defense later found to be invalid (TBBD), these failures diminish public faith in the system and may result in a reluctance to trust it and to participate in it. Given that child protection relies on members of the public reporting cases of suspected abuse, society cannot afford to undermine public confidence in the child protection system.
In addition, these cases have, quite properly, discredited evidence of the expert witnesses involved. Both the MSBP and TBBD cases share the common If... the truth is that the parent has injured the child non-accidentally, the damage done by an opinion which exonerates the parent is severe. The process of acceptance and recognition is either set back or destroyed; the parent's conviction that he or she has not injured the child is reinforced; the question of rehabilitation of the child is rendered more complex and the risks to the child of a return to parental care become even more difficult to quantify. In short, both the parents and more importantly the child, whose interests are paramount, are illserved.
[Vol. 16:2 characteristic of experts being allowed by the courts to advance their own theories -theories to which the experts were particularly attached. To some extent, the lawyers involved must bear responsibility. Why did those opposing the cases advanced by Sir Roy Meadow et al. not seek out their own experts of the right kind? Is this an indication of lawyers simply not being sufficiently well-versed in the sciences? It is a feature of the adversarial system that reliance is placed on the competing attorneys to make their cases. With the twenty-twenty vision afforded by hindsight, it seems that Sir Roy Meadow made some fundamental and elementary errors in the use of statistics. That did not become apparent until the General Medical Council heard evidence in his disciplinary case. 131 Had the defense lawyers working for Ms. Clark, Ms. Cannings, and Ms. Anthony known more about statistics, could the whole problem have been avoided? As we have seen, it was the evidence of other experts in the TBBD cases that went a long way to alerting the courts to the problems with Dr. Paterson's theory. It is not usually the function of the court to conduct its own investigation into the facts. Perhaps it should be or, at least, perhaps the court should have greater opportunity to appoint independent experts to assist it.
If these experiences make experts and courts more careful in the future, then that is all to the good. Certainly, there are recent examples of the established position of experts being called into question in other contexts and it may be that this questioning process has been facilitated by the recent experiences of MSBP and TBBD. So, for example, a healthy debate is now underway with respect to shaken baby syndrome and the evidence of its occurrence. 32 However, these cases may have had a more general negative effect in tainting all expert evidence, creating a risk that well-researched and accurate expert evidence may carry less weight in the future. This, in turn, could lead to further injustice to litigants and risk to children.
What of the professionals involved? Clearly, individual careers have been damaged. For Sir Roy Meadow, who is seventy-two years old and retired, the temporary loss of his license to practice medicine had little practical impact.
Nor was the diminution to his reputation as significant as it might have been. While disciplinary proceedings were pending, he was invited to speak at an international conference.
1 33 Only one week after he lost his license, the Court of Appeal, in England, went out of its way to stress that Sir Roy Meadow "had and still has enormous expertise" as a child abuse expert. 134 Dr. Colin
131.
See supra footnote 76 and accompanying text. 132. See supra footnote 6. 133. Doward, supra note 54 (reporting that he was invited to speak at an international conference for child protection workers in San Diego in January 2005). An argument might be made that, since disciplinary proceedings were pending, it was correct that he should benefit from the presumption of innocence. However, the convictions of Sally Clark and Angela Cannings had already been overturned by this time and there had been considerable publicity of Sir Roy's role in each.
134 36 where a professional has overstated a case or has erred, causing such significant consequences for others, public sympathy is likely to be somewhat minimal.
The lack of humility shown by some of the experts involved is remarkable. Most have not apologized for their actions, albeit Sir Roy Meadow came close at the eleventh hour in the course of his disciplinary hearing before the GMC. 1 37 For some of the experts involved, the failure to engage in a public "mea culpa" may be due to the fact that they still think they are correct. 38 Others may believe their actions are excused by the fact that they acted in good faith. 139 What of the impact on the medical profession, more generally? Failure by an individual member of a profession reflects badly on the profession as a whole, which is why bar associations are so harsh on attorneys who transgress. On The recent cases concerning cot deaths ... and suspected Munchausen syndrome by proxy (which has been redefined in recent years as "factitious or induced illness") have confused the legal and medical professions and public... . We accept that there must be a review of any cases involving unexplained infant deaths where there may have been a miscarriage of justice. However, this will do nothing to restore public and [Vol. 16:2 professional confidence in the management of child abuse. Many medical posts in the field of child protection remain unfilled and paediatricians are, not surprisingly, increasingly reluctant to act as expert witnesses in these complex cases. 140
If, as indeed appears to be the case, young doctors are less willing to enter the field of community pediatrics for fear of litigation,1 4 1 and experienced pediatricians are becoming reluctant to offer their services as expert witnesses, then the child protection system is, again, placed in jeopardy. However, Professor Craft's response to justified public concern is somewhat defensive, if not downright threatening. It comes very close to saying, "if you dare to criticize us, we will take our ball and go home." 142 To be fair, once some of the dust had settled, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health took a more constructive approach to the issues raised. It launched two reviews, one examining the quality of evidence in recent high-profile child abuse cases and the other addressing recent research on child abuse. 143 In addition, together with the Royal College of Pathologists, it established a working group to develop a protocol for the care and investigations of SIDS cases.144 Despite the 
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responses of the professional bodies, some members of the medical profession continue to see Sir Roy Meadow's treatment as scapegoating. 145 Lest we respond to these implicit threats and fall into the trap of undue deference to medical experts, it is worth noting that a balance can be struck. In Kent County Council v. The Mother, The Father, B, 146 for example, a mother, who claimed she had been falsely accused of suffering from MSBP and harming her child, sought to publicize her case in the press. The pediatricians involved sought to protect their identity. In balancing the competing interests of freedom of speech and privacy, Justice Munby noted that, "it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Sir Roy Meadow has been pilloried and almost demonised in the media." 147 However, he acknowledged that "there is a powerful public interest... in knowing who the experts are whose theories and evidence underpin judicial decisions which are increasingly coming under critical and sceptical scrutiny." 1 48 In the event, he went on to protect the identity of two pediatricians.
Central to ensuring that the legal system makes the best use of sound expert evidence while guarding against that which is hasty, exaggerated, or just plain wrong, are the rules and procedures employed by courts in admitting expert evidence and attaching the appropriate weight to it. What, then, are the relevant rules and procedures?
ADMITING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE WEIGHT TO BE ATTACHED TO IT
In England and Wales, reference is made to the "expert witness" 1 49 and, while the more traditional Scottish term is "skilled witness,"' 150 the former will be used here since it is used and understood in both jurisdictions.1 5 1
Essentially, there are three issues to be resolved with respect to expert evidence. First is the question of admissibility: that is, whether the expert evidence will be [Vol. '16:2 heard at all. Second, if expert evidence is admitted, there is the issue of the content of the expert's evidence and, in particular, the permitted parameters of opinion evidence. Third is the matter of the weight to be attached to the expert's evidence. The first two issues are questions of law, to be decided by the court, and the third is for the trier of fact, either a judge or a jury. It is worth bearing in mind that, in civil cases in the United Kingdom, fact-finding is almost exclusively the province of the judiciary, since civil juries are something of a rarity and are unknown in adoption and child protection proceedings. In criminal trials, juries are a key feature of the system except for more minor offences.
Turning to the question of the admissibility of expert evidence, the first hurdle to overcome is demonstrating the need for such evidence. As Lord Justice Lawton put it: "[i]f on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary."'
152
Ordinary human behavior is usually regarded as inappropriate for expert testimony for this reason.1 53 Giving a hint of the danger of undue deference to experts, his Lordship continued:
The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is a danger that they may think it does. Since medical conditions and syndromes will often be beyond the knowledge of ordinary people, evidence about them from an expert will often be entirely appropriate. Assuming that the court accepts the need for expert evidence, the qualifications and experience of the individual expert proffered must be established. Details of the witness' degrees, other qualifications, publications, memberships of learned societies, and professional organizations, and the like, will normally suffice to demonstrate the requisite level of expertise.'
55 Only rarely will a witness be cross-examined on the question of qualifications, and Unlike their counterparts in the United States, where judges perform a gate-keeping function, 5 6 courts in the United Kingdom do not engage in detailed exploration of the subject-matter of the evidence at this stage, since that is more usually addressed in assessing the weight to be attached to the evidence. Nonetheless, the ordinary rules of relevance and reliability apply, 1 5 7 and these may inject an element of gate-keeping when the court determines whether the evidence proffered is, indeed, expert evidence at all. Thus, for example, the Court of Appeal in England found inadmissible the evidence of a psychologist who offered his opinion on human behavior indicating the likelihood of the deceased having committed suicide, rather than having been killed by her husband, on the basis that it "was not expert evidence of a kind properly to be placed before the Court."' 158 In reaching this conclusion, it noted, "his reports identify no criteria by reference to which the Court could test the quality of his opinions: there is no data base comparing real and questionable suicides and there is no substantial body of academic writing approving his methodology."' ' 59 Having got the expert witness into court, what of the content of the evidence he or she may give? Frequently, the expert will be giving evidence of matters observed first-hand or tests he or she has carried out, with the evidence of the pathologist who carried out an autopsy being an obvious example. It is permissible for the expert to refer to relevant literature and texts and passages so referred to, although not the rest of the document, become part of the expert's opinion. 16° Most significant for our purpose is the role of the expert witness in expressing opinions. It is sometimes suggested that there is a general rule to the effect that a witness must give evidence of facts, not opinions. However, it is widely acknowledged that the rule is honored more in the breach than the observance, even as it relates to non-expert (ordinary) witnesses. 161. Indeed, the Law Reform Committee noted that an ordinary witness might more naturally give an accurate account of events by mixing a certain amount of opinion with the [Vol. 16:2 "the issue involves scientific knowledge, or acquaintance with the rules of any trade, manufacture, or business, with which men of ordinary intelligence are not likely to be familiar,"' ' 62 it is permissible for the expert witness to express opinions on the relevant matters and, indeed, that is often the whole point of calling an expert witness. An obvious example here would be the expert witness speaking to the standard of care to be expected of a member of a particular profession. However, it is crucial that, prior to offering opinion evidence, a factual basis for that evidence must be laid. 163 This will be of particular importance where, for example, a witness is speaking to the existence of a syndrome and its applicability to a particular individual, but has never met or examined the individual.
In all of this, the role of the expert is to assist the court, rather than to advocate for a particular position 64 A Scottish court had the opportunity to explore this point in a recent case, where the widow of a cigarette smoker who had died of lung cancer was seeking damages from a tobacco company. 1 65 The court heard from a number of expert witnesses on the subject of the link between smoking cigarettes and contracting lung cancer. It noted that the witnesses for the pursuer (plaintiff) "were or had been connected in one way or another with ASH [an anti-smoking lobbying group], and were clearly committed to the anti-smoking cause; and no doubt for this reason were prepared to give evidence gratis."' 66 While this generosity on their part was not, in itself, fatal, the court felt it justified "scrutiny of each of their evidence, so as to see to what extent they complied with their obligations as independent expert witnesses and how soundly based their views were."' 167 In the event, the at first sight appears to be of fact, may prove to be actually of belief or opinion" and citing identification of a person as an example).
162. DICKSON, supra note 150, at 397.
163. TAPPER, supra note 149, at 568. ("The facts upon which an expert's opinion is based must be proved by admissible evidence .... ); WALKER, supra note 151, at 244 ("Since opinion is based on a certain state of facts, it is valueless unless the facts are averred and proved.").
164. In National Justice Compania Naviera S.A. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd, [199312 Lloyd's Rep. 68, 22 (Eng.), Mr. Justice Cresswell set out the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses and included the following:
1. Expert evidence presented to the Court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation ....
2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise .... An expert witness in the High Court should never assume the role of an advocate. 166. Id. at 15.18. The court noted that the expert witnesses for the defender had charged for their services but found this unsurprising stating: "Ihis is generally the case: expert witnesses are usually professional people who would normally expect to seek appropriate remuneration for research, preparation of reports and attendance at court." Id.
167. Id. at 5.18.
court found that none of them had been "mindful of the need to be independent and each appeared... to engage in advocacy to a greater or lesser extent," 168 and this greatly diminished the value the court attached to their evidence. The opinion of a given expert is open to challenge, of course, either through cross-examination or by leading other expert witnesses who reach a different conclusion: a technique used to great effect in McTear. Despite these safeguards, it is a matter for concern that expert witnesses were able to have the impact they did in the context of MSBP and TBBD. However, such problems with expert scientific evidence are not new. 169 On the third question posed at the beginning of this section, the weight to be attached to the expert's evidence, one cannot do better than to remember the words of Lord President Cooper from 1953. In what has come to be the locus classicus of the position of the expert witness in the Scottish courts, he said:
Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent, can give no more than evidence. They cannot usurp the functions of the jury or a Judge sitting as a jury .... Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence... the decision is for the Judge or jury. This position has long been accepted in England, where the above passage is cited frequently with approval.' 7 ' The weight to be attached to particular evidence is a question of fact and, on occasion, courts have been quite brutal in their condemnation of particular expert evidence.
172 While the trier of fact is not bound by expert opinion, the Court of Appeal issued the following warning:
168. Id. at16.149. 169" In the 1970s and 1980s, the evidence of a leading Home Office forensic scientist resulted in a number of successful appeals in criminal cases. In Preece v. H.M. Advocate, 1981 CRIM.L.R. 783 (198 1),a man who had served seven years of a life sentence had his conviction overturned when it became apparent that the expert had drawn unwarranted conclusions from blood samples and seminal stains. In 1999, a police officer, Shirley McKie, was acquitted of perjury arising from the alleged presence of her fingerprint at a murder scene where she claimed never to have been. Her acquittal was based largely on two fingerprint witnesses from the United States who discredited the evidence of the experts from the Scottish Criminal Records Office Fingerprint Bureau. An internal inquiry followed, resulting in changes in procedure, and the man convicted of the murder appealed. For a discussion of this case, see RArrT, supra note 151at 347. In Where expert evidence is admissible in order to enable the judge to reach a properly informed decision on a technical matter, then he cannot set his own 'lay' opinion against the expert evidence which he has heard. But he is not bound to accept the evidence even of an expert witness, if there is a proper basis for rejecting it in the other evidence which he has heard, or the expert evidence is such that he does not believe it or for whatever reason is not convinced by it. 1 73
As we have seen, there was considerable criticism of the evidence of Dr. Paterson in the courts. It took longer for Sir Roy Meadow's evidence to be subject to similar challenge, but the courts got there eventually. Nonetheless, in each case, we have examples of later-discredited evidence being admitted and weight being attached to it. This can only add strength to the calls for rethinking the law on admissibility of expert evidence in the United Kingdom. 174 In that, can anything be learned from the very different approach taken in the United States?
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, the court must be satisfied, first, that the assistance of an expert is warranted by the subject-matter in question. That is to say, "the subject of the inference must be so distinctively related to a science, profession, business, or occupation as to beyond the ken of lay persons."' 175 While there is some support for the view that this permits the judge a degree of latitude in determining whether an expert is really required, the Federal Rules of Evidence tend to permit expert evidence where it is simply helpful. Rule 702 provides for the use of expert evidence "if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ... ."176 The second hurdle to overcome, in introducing expert evidence, relates to the credentials of the particular expert witness presented, since Rule 702 refers to "an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education . . . 177 Given the vaccine, Lord Justice Sedley went as far as to brand the views of one expert witness "junk science").
173 abundance of experts offering their services, this should not be a difficult hurdle to leap. State courts apply much the same two tests in terms of subjectmatter need and the qualification of the expert.
178
Thereafter, the U.S. approach to admissibility of expert evidence diverges, quite dramatically, from that found in the United Kingdom, by requiring U.S. judges to play a more active part in assessing the validity of scientific evidence. The following is a brief overview of how this central role for the judiciary has developed. The federal courts first recognized the need for a specific rule in 1923, in what came to be known as the "Frye test", which requires that expert evidence had to be "generally accepted" in order to be admissible. Considering whether to admit evidence of a "systolic blood pressure test" (a precursor of the polygraph), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was confronted, in Frye v. United States, 179with a novel scientific development. It articulated the test in the following terms:
Just when scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 180 While the Frye test was adopted subsequently in many state courts, 18 1 its status was called into question at federal level in the 1970s, in part due to what were then the new Federal Rules of Evidence. 182 In addition, there were concerns that either it excluded useful evidence or that some evidence could pass the test and yet result in a court being presented with evidence that was too inconclusive to be of assistance.
The Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of 'good science', in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.... The fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised. was subsumed into a more wide-ranging enquiry. Only if the evidence qualifies under the first step, need the judge move on to the second step and assess the relevance of the evidence to the particular case and admit it if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue" .192 This second issue has been described as one of "fit" and as "an aspect of relevancy and helpfulness". 193 As the Court acknowledged, "'[flit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes". 194 The Daubert test has been adopted, in whole or in part, in over thirty states. 195 It was refined by subsequent case law 196 and, as a result, the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended further in 2001 to include more specific reference to Daubert-type criteria. 1 97 The result is that U.S. judges are now called upon to play a very active gatekeeping function in assessing expert evidence at the stage of admissibility. The Daubert Court itself was at pains to point out that the judge is focused "solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate," albeit the Court has since acknowledged that "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another."' 199 The Court was mindful of the dangers posed by scientific evidence and noted Rule 403 of the not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community. Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." 2 00 Further, it addressed the concern raised in the case that its approach would "result in a 'free-for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions". 20 1 However, it viewed this concern as "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and the adversary system generally." ' 2 0 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Daubert noted that "judges should not become amateur scientists ' 2°3 but as has been observed, "that and more is surely what Daubert presupposes."2U Initially, at least, it has been suggested that members of the federal judiciary were not particularly welcoming of the Daubert test. 20 5 A recent survey of U.S. state judges sheds more light on how the Daubert test operated prior to the latest round of amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it addresses the operation of basic concepts that remain central to admissibility decisions. In the first part of the study, 2°6 four hundred state judges were sampled and ninety-four percent of those responding said they found the Daubert test valuable in their decision-making, with fifty-five percent expressing the view that it provided "a great deal of value." 20 7 So much for the popularity of Daubert, but what of its efficacy? This is where the survey signals cause for concern, since it demonstrated that an overwhelming number ofjudges did not understand two of the basic concepts used in the Daubert test. While eighty-eight percent of the judges reported that they found "falsifiability" to be a useful guideline in determining the merits of proffered scientific evidence, only six percent of them demonstrated a true understanding of the concept of falsifiability. 2 08 Similarly, while ninety-one percent ofjudges reported that they found "error rates" to be useful in assessing the quality of the evidence offered, only four percent of them demonstrated an accurate understanding of the definition of error rates . 2 09 They did considerably better in understanding what was meant by two of the other Daubert criteria, "peer review and publication" 2 10 and "general acceptance", 2 1 ' but the results of the study do suggest that a Daubert-type test is, perhaps, just too technical and complicated for every-day use in the courts. Like earlier studies, analyzing judicial opinions, it may be that judges simply do not have the requisite knowledge or skills to engage in this kind of scientific evaluation. 2 12 The second part of the study was based on the responses of 325 state judges 2 1 3 and was rather more specific in its ambit. 214 For our present purpose, the responses addressing psychological syndromes are of particular interest. 21 1
Id.
Judicial experience of a range of syndromes varied 216 and, while MSPB was not one of the syndromes addressed by the researchers specifically, eight of the judges mentioned "factitious disorders" when asked about experience of other
21
syndromes.2'7 The judges were asked to identify what aspects of psychological syndrome evidence they found most problematic in determining admissibility.
Perhaps it is rather telling that few of the judges mentioned the Daubert criteria at all, 218 referring slightly more often to qualification of the expert, subjectivity of the diagnostic process, and application to the particular case (relevance), as being of greater concern.
While one might conclude from this that the judges surveyed found the Daubert criteria unproblematic, the results of Part I of the study, demonstrating a lack of judicial competence in aspects of the criteria, should be borne in mind. Thus, it is not unreasonable for the researchers to conclude, as they do, that their "results reveal a strong tendency for judges to continue to rely on more traditional standards such as general acceptance and qualifications of the expert when assessing psychological syndrome . . . evidence. '22°W
OULD APPLICATION OF THE DAUBERT TEST HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE?
A crucial question is whether application of the Daubert test would have dealt with the Meadow-Paterson problem in a U.S. context. As we have seen, the Daubert test involves a number of elements: falsifiability; peer review and publication; error rate; and general acceptability. 221 We have also seen that many judges have a great deal better understanding of two of these elementspeer review and publication and general acceptability -than they do of the others. 222 It can certainly be argued that it is the factors that judges understand that weigh most heavily when they make their decisions. Conversely, if judges do not understand some of the elements of the Daubert test, it can be doubted that these factors play any significant part in their decision-making process. There is no reason to suppose that members of the judiciary in the United Kingdom are any more science-savvy than their U.S. counterparts and, indeed, their educational backgrounds may suggest that many are likely to be less so. 223 Turning first to peer review and publication, it should be remembered that both Sir Roy Meadow and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Dr. Paterson were eminent members of their profession with a slew of publications to their names. As far as general acceptability is concerned, it is important to note that it already forms part of the test of admissibility of expert evidence in the United Kingdom. In any event, Sir Roy Meadow certainly had no difficulty in attracting a significant following from other members of the profession, in part 218. Id. at 72. The most often-cited of the Daubert criteria was "general acceptance", which was mentioned by nine percent of the judges, with "falsifiability" and "peer review and publication" receiving only three mentions each. 224 Even supposing that the other elements of the Daubert test -falsifiability and error rates -had been understood and applied, the very facts that might have caused the expert evidence to be rejected were not led in the MSBP cases.
It is difficult to assess whether the Daubert test proved helpful with respect to MSBP in the United States in avoiding the debacle experienced in the United Kingdom, since the position taken here is not that the phenomenon of parents fabricating illness in children never occurs. We have ample evidence that it does. The difficulty exemplified by the United Kingdom cases is that it was being inappropriately diagnosed. Thus, the fact that MSBP has been found to be present in a given case in the United States is of no assistance. 2 25 Slightly more insight can be gleaned from how TBBD played out in the United States. As we have seen, the evidence of Dr. Paterson was accepted in at least two cases in the United States, 226 but under a version of the Frye test. Certainly, attempts to lead evidence from the home-grown TBBD proponent, Dr. Marvin Miller, seem to have met with considerably less success, 227 so it may be that Daubert had some impact.
All of this suggests no more than that application of a test along the lines of the Daubert test might have made a difference, at least in the some of the TBBD cases. That is hardly a resounding vote of confidence. When one considers the difficulty experienced in the United States in applying the test, the conclusion must be that adopting such a test would not, in itself, guarantee that the problems experienced in the United Kingdom would be avoided. Thus, we must look at what else we might do.
WHAT ELSE MIGHT BE DONE?
Recent experiences in the United Kingdom with MSPB and TBBD serve as a warning that legal systems must take greater care in the use of expert evidence, not only in respect of these examples, but over the whole spectrum of syndromes, disorders and conditions. The state of our knowledge and understanding of the world around us is advancing at an unprecedented rate and "4science" plays an enormous part in that. Almost daily, new studies are published on this or that and new theories emerge. In so far as they contribute to debate within the scientific community, this is all very healthy. In so far as they may offer insights into new treatments for troubled people, rather more caution may be warranted. It is when we turn to the use of this developing knowledge in court proceedings that we are presented with an enormous challenge. In the context of the family, the decision to admit particular evidence may have far-reaching consequences for the safety of an individual child, the privacy and integrity of a given family, or the liberty of a particular parent. The evidence may relate to whether a condition exists at all, as in the case of TBBD, or to the applicability of a given condition, like MSBP, in the case of a particular individual.
The trick for the legal system is to identify that which is sufficiently wellresearched and well-tested to warrant placing reliance on it and to reject the rest. We have heard the admonition against treating "all science as a single discipline distinguished only by its classification as valid orjunk." ' 228 That may be sound advice on how to approach scientific inquiry, but the point is that evidence is either admissible, or it is not. There is no subtle middle ground in that decision. On the one hand, if we admit evidence that later proves to be exaggerated, too generalized, or just plain wrong, we risk injustices of the type outlined in the foregoing discussions of MSBP and TBBD. On the other hand, if we simply place more obstacles in the way of admitting expert testimony in court, we risk missing the opportunity to understand better what is happening. Many theories that were once controversial are now well-accepted. In this context, it is tempting to cite Galileo's view that the earth might not be the center of the universe and the reaction of many of his contemporaries that his position was not only wrong but blasphemous. However, there are numerous, more recent examples of theories that were once novel and are now accepted. It was a long and hard battle to get courts to accept the impact of a history of domestic abuse in driving the victim to kill her aggressor. 229 
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new information while, at the same time, guarding against unfounded theories. So what can we do to enhance the ability of judges to make the decision? It is tempting to advocate a macro solution, like abandoning the adversarial system in favor of the more inquisitorial model of justice found in many European countries. This would place the court under the obligation to find its own experts and remove the iniquity of impecunious defenders being placed at a disadvantage when pitted against the limitless resources of the state in finding experts willing to testify. Aside the fact that such a radical change to the legal system is unlikely to happen any time soon in either the United Kingdom or the United States, the question remains whether this would solve the problem. It would still leave the judge with the question of what scientific evidence to admit and this, in turn, would require assessment of the evidence being proffered. In short, we would be no further forward. A more modest solution might be to suggest that old favorite of family lawyers -the family court. But, still, the problem of admissibility of scientific evidence would remain. Granted, if the particular judge was hearing only a discreet range of cases (family-related matters), the range of expert evidence proffered might be narrower, thus enabling him or her to develop a familiarity with the science and the evidence. However, that would be of little help as new theories emerged, as they most certainly will.
Still on the macro level, but rather more attainable, would be to improve the education of lawyers and judges so that each has a better understanding of scientific methodology and information. It will be recalled that in Sir Roy Meadow's case, the fundamental errors he made in respect of statistical analysis did not become apparent until he was being disciplined by the General Medical Council. Throughout the cases in which he gave evidence, it seems his powerful evidence about the probability of more than one child dying of SIDS in the same family went unchallenged. If ever there was an example of lawyers "not knowing what we don't know", that was it. If one does not know what to question, one cannot know what other expert advice to seek and to offer to the court. Unless the court is given the full range of competing expert views, how can it assess the reliability of scientific evidence? As we saw with the example of TBBD, it was only once the courts were exposed to the views of those who disagreed with Dr. Paterson's theory that they were able to discount his evidence. In order to meet these problems, it has been suggested that "[t]hose involved in legal education at every level should make efforts to raise the scientific literacy of all those involved in the legal system., '231 Those who advocate this approach "are not proposing that judges become scientists but only that they be trained to ask relevant questions when determining the admissibility of proffered scientific evidence', 232 and that "[w]hat judges need to know is not how to design the best scientific study, but how to evaluate 231. Gatowski We are beginning to appreciate that meaningful legal education goes well beyond teaching law students "the law" and legal methodology. This, in turn, requires law teachers to be more aware of the broader picture of law in context. 3 In the meantime, resources have been developed to assist the judiciary and lawyers, and more could be done here. 2 35 The recent U.K. experience suggests that there may be a case for the judiciary taking a more active gatekeeping role in assessing the admissibility of expert evidence. On the other hand, as we have seen, it may be that a fullblown Daubert test is rather too complex for judges to apply, causing them to rely on concepts they understand, like peer review publication and general acceptability. Of course, a more science-savvy judiciary, assisted by similarly improved attorneys, might make the Daubert test more useful, but we might also consider reformulating the test to ask simpler questions. For example, Moreno suggests that judges ask themselves: "How did the experts arrive at their conclusions?;" "How did the experts test their conclusions?;" and "How did the experts rule out other conclusions? ' 236 In addition, there are a number of ways in which the presentation of expert evidence could be policed or changed. First, we might consider using expert witnesses selected from a panel of experts accredited by their own profession. 237 It has been suggested that such a body should be independent, set standards of competence, have a code of conduct making clear to expert witnesses what is expected of them, and have the power to remove a given expert from the panel in certain circumstances.
23 8 At first sight, such a solution looks attractive since it suggests a monitoring of experts by members of their own profession and might reduce the incidence of mavericks peddling their own particular theories. However, there is the danger that those who were advancing a theory outside the mainstream of accepted wisdom in the 233. Gatowski 
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profession might be excluded, thus denying the courts the opportunity to hear new ideas and challenges to existing ones. In any event, the courts seem to have little difficulty in assessing the credentials of experts. Perhaps most telling of all is that Sir Roy Meadow would, most probably, have had little difficulty in gaining accreditation from his peers. After all, he was a former president of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Care.
A second possibility would be for the court to appoint expert witnesses in place of, or in addition to, those proffered by the parties. 239 Such a system presupposes a panel of experts from which the court would choose so that the benefits and shortcomings of that aspect are rolled into any system involving a court-appointed expert. There are other advantages, as well. First, the impecunious defender (whether in a criminal case or a case relating to child protection) would not be placed at a disadvantage by his or her lack of resources. Second, where the court-appointed expert is the only expert heard, there would be cost savings. Third, it is less likely that a court-appointed expert would be chosen to advance a particular position, and the so-called "battle of the experts" could be avoided. However, it is often the case that there is more than one credible view on matters covered by scientific evidence, and the danger is that the court would not be afforded the full picture. A variation on the idea of a court-appointed expert is to give the court the power to direct that evidence be given by a joint expert. If the parties cannot agree on a joint expert, then the court will appoint one. This is the solution found in the new Civil Procedure Rules in England and Wales, 24 0 as part of a far-reaching reform of civil justice system there, resulting from the Woolf Report. 241 It should be noted that these rules are confined to civil cases and that family proceedings are exempt from them. 24 2 Again, while this has the attraction of reducing costs, there is the danger that the court will be deprived of competing views from relevant professionals. CONCLUSION So, to return to our original question, is there a phenomenon -"Undue Deference to Experts Syndrome" -at work in the legal system? There is no doubt that the legal systems in the United Kingdom have been shaken, if not rocked, by the recent experiences of expert witnesses and their evidence about MSBP and TBBD. Individuals have been incarcerated, families dismantled, and children returned to potentially abusive parents, all because courts were persuaded by medical experts with impressive credentials who pedaled their own theories. Where does responsibility for these debacles lie? Clearly, some of the responsibility lies with the expert witnesses themselves. They were either too blinkered or too arrogant to admit to the doubts that existed about their own theories, or they failed in their fundamental duty to offer balanced and impartial testimony. In short, they were fallible human beings and they have paid the price for their fallibility. However, it is the responsibility of the legal system to protect against just such human failings. Initially, at least, the legal system failed to do so. Some responsibility must lie with the adversarial system that encourages lawyers to seek out witnesses who will support their case. While that very system should ensure that other, possibly equally singleminded experts are found by opposing counsel, ignorance or economics may preclude that from happening. In this, the lawyers, and those who educate them, failed. Certainly, it is difficult "to know what you don't know", but lawyers must be vigilant to ensure that expert evidence is subjected to rigorous scrutiny by trawling for all of the necessary specialists to assist them. They would be armed to do so better if legal education included additional components specifically addressing scientific method. Ultimately, however, responsibility lies with the courts. It was the courts that permitted the educated, confident and articulate Sir Roy Meadow to make the sweeping statements that so swayed juries. Similarly, while Dr. Paterson's evidence first appeared in the courts in 1988, doubt was being cast on his evidence in the early 1990s and, while courts continued to criticize him, he went on appearing throughout that decade and into the next. There seems little doubt that very considerable deference is shown to expert medical witnesses by the courts. If we have learned anything from the MSBP and TBBD debacles, it is that we must not allow "considerable deference" to become "undue deference."
